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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING "OTHER INSURANCE"
CLAUSES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIANA
Recently, a federal district court' was faced with the frequently
litigated question of determining the relative liability of two insurance
companies providing concurrent coverage for the same loss. The question
arose over an automobile accident in which Salvadore Pol, while operat-
ing Jose Venegas's automobile, injured Will Winfield. Pol's insurer,
Allstate Insurance Company,2 covered his liability since the policy
provided coverage whenever he operated a non-owned vehicle.' Venegas
was insured by American Underwriters Incorporated,' and his policy
extended coverage to Pol under its omnibus clause which protected any
person operating Venegas's automobile with his permission.' Therefore,
Pol, who was facing a tort action by the injured Winfield, had liability
coverage from both Allstate and American. Both policies, however, had
provisions commonly known as "other insurance" clauses limiting the
insurers' liability in the event their insured had coverage from another
policy. Allstate's policy contained an excess "other insurance" clause,'
while the American policy had an escape provision.7 Allstate brought a
declaratory judgment action in the Federal Court of the Northern
District of Indiana to determine which insurance company would be
primarily liable. Judge Beamer, in the absence of any reported Indiana
case law, adopted the minority view' by finding the clauses mutually
repugnant and ordering the liability to be prorated between the insurers
on the basis of their respective limits of liability.
1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
2. Hereinafter referred to as Allstate.
3. 312 F. Supp. at 1387 n. 2.
4. Hereinafter referred to as American.
5. 312 F. Supp. at 1387 n. 2.
6. If there is other insurance...
Allstate shall not be liable under this Part I [bodily injury and property
damage] for a greater proportion of any loss than the applicable limit of liabiliy
stated on the Supplement Page bears to the total applicable limit of liability of
all collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance with
respect to a temporary substitute automobile or a non-owned automobile shall
be excess insurance over any other collectible insurance.
Id. at 1387.
7. If the insured has other insurance against loss to which the liability
coverage applies, then this policy shall not in any way apply .... It is the intent
of this provision to make this policy's liability coverages contingent upon the
non-existence of other insurance.
Id.
8. See notes 37-80 infra, and accompanying text.
"OTHER INSURANCE"
Although there is no Indiana precedent on this issue, there is little
doubt that insurers within the state have adopted the majority view as a
rule of practice.' Under the majority view the liability of insurers is
allocated on a primary and secondary basis through a construction of
the "other insurance" clauses."0 Since the federal court's decision is not
conclusive as to the ultimate direction Indiana law will take, the purpose
of this note is to examine the basis for both views in an attempt to
evaluate their relative merits.
The occurrence of concurrent insurance coverage, circumstances in
which an insured's loss is covered by two" or more' insurers, results
primarily from non-owned vehicle clauses and statutorily required omni-
bus clauses'" in liability policies. Insurance companies insert "other
insurance" provisions 4 in their policies in an attempt to reduce or elimin-
ate liability in these peripheral areas in the event the insured has other
coverage.'
9. Conclusion drawn by the writer from conversations with various members of
the Indiana bar.
10. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio St. 2d 45, 261
N.E.2d 128 (1970), and New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds,
London, 34 Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966), are recent examples of courts in neighbor-
ing jurisdictions affirming the majority view's method of reconciliation. Both decisions
are based on extremely tenuous technical constructions of the language found in the
policies. The only significance which may be attached to these cases is that they
refute the existence of a consistent trend to accept the minority position. See also note 37
infra for a list of states which have adopted the majority view.
11. See, e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.
2d 583 (Tex. 1969) ; Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195
F.2d 958 .(9th Cir. 1952) ; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Cal. App.
2d 793, 75 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969) ; Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 409
F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341
P.2d 110 (1959) ; Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N .W.
2d 413 (1970).
12. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. v. Saskatchewan Gov't Ins. Office, 238 Ore. 8, 391
P.2d 616 (1964) ; Marwell Constr., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, -Alas.-,
465 P.2d 298 (1970); Lubow v. Morrissey, 13 Wis2d 114, 108 N.W.2d 156 (1961).
13. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4309 (Burns Repl. 1965). See generally 7
J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcTIcE § 4353 (2d ed. 1962); 7 D. BLASHFIELD,
AUTOmOBLE LAW AND PRAcTicE § 315.6 (3d ed. 1966); 12 G. CoucH, Couch oN
INsu NcE 2d § 45:309 (2d ed. Anderson 1964) ; Note, Automobile Liability Insurance
-Effect of Double Co'verage and "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. R1v. 838,
840 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Automobile Liability Insurance].
14. Much of the language used in the "other insurance" clauses is derived from
property insurance area where it was used to prevent the moral temptation of destroying
one's property subsequent to insuring it with numerous insurers for a total greater than
its true value. See generally Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
444 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. 1969) ; Note, Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability
Insurance, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 319, 320 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Concurrent Cover-
age]; Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 840; Smith, The Proratio
Clause, 1949 INs. L.J. 83, 84; 9 G. Coucir, supra note 13, at §§ 37:1291-92.
15. See Concurrent Coverage, supra note 14, at 320; Automobile Liability Insurance,
supra note 13, at 839.
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Generally "other insurance" clauses take one of the following three
forms: (1) proratad' clauses which provide that the insurer will be liable
only for a prorata share of the loss, usually in proportion to the limits
of liability of its policy in relation to the limits of liability of all other
valid and collectable insurance; (2) excess"T clauses which provide that
the insurer will be liable for any loss which exceeds the limits of liability
of all other valid and collectable insurance; and (3) escape"8 clauses which
provide that the policy affords no coverage if other insurance is available.
In addition, some policies contain combinations of the above types.' 9
The principle case presents one of the most common situations
where concurrent insurance coverage exists. However, it by no means
exhausts the circumstances under which this problem may arise." Other
16. See, e.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 118, 341
P.2d 110, 114 (1959):
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this policy the
Company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such
loss than the applicable limit of liability ...bears to the total applicable limit
of all valid and collectable insurance....
17. Id. at 118, 341 P.2d at 114: "If the Insured's liability under this policy is
covered by any other valid and collectable insurance, then this policy shall act as excess
insurance over and above such other insurance."
18. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 18 F.
Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Ky. 1937):
If any other Assured included in this insurance is covered by valid and
collectable insurance against a claim also covered by this Policy, he shall not
be entitled to protection under this Policy.
See notes 64-74 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of a variation of this
type of clause.
19. See, e.g., note 6 supra for prorata-excess clause; escape-excess-Insurance Co.
of Texas v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
If other valid insurance exists protecting the insured from liability for such
bodily injury ...or destruction of property, this policy shall be null and void
with respect to such specific hazard otherwise covered, whether the insured
is specifically named in such other policy or not; provided, however, that if the
applicable limit of liability of this policy exceeds the applicable limit of such
other valid insurance, then this policy shall apply as excess insurance against
such hazard in an amount equal to the applicable limit of liability of this policy
minus the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
prorata-escape-New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 18 F.
Supp. 707, 709 (W.D. Ky. 1937) :
If the named Assured carries any other Insurance covering concurrently a claim
covered by this Policy, he shall not recover from the Company a larger pro-
portion of any such claim than the sum hereby insured bears to the whole
amount of valid and collectable concurrent insurance. If any other Assured
included in this insurance is covered by valid and collectable insurance against
a claim also covered by this Policy, he shall not be entitled to protection under
this Policy.
20. See Billings, The "Other Insurance" Provision of the Automobile Policy,
1949 INs. L.J. 498, in which the author lists eight situations where concurrent coverage
may arise. See also Rollins, Conflicting Automobile Coverage, 64 N.J.L.J. 329 (1941)
Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 839.
"'OTHER INSURANCE"
recurring concurrent coverage problem areas are with leased vehicles,"1
new car tryouts,2" and "loaners" from garages."
In the initial years of the problem of concurrent insurance coverage
three theories were used to settle the question." The "prior-in-time"
theory, which developed out of property law concepts, 2 assigned primary
liability to the insurer whose policy became effective first.2" Apparently
no jurisdiction follows this approach today, since courts quicldy realized
that this inquiry is irrelevant where each policy was in effect at the time
the insured's liability arose."
The "primary tortfeasor" theory held the insurer primarily liable
in whose policy the negligent party was the named insured.2" Although
21. See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75
Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969) ; Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 244 Md. 392, 223
A.2d 594 (1966) ; Federal Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 71, 250 N.E.2d
193, 302 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1969) ; Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d
925 (1939); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110
(1959) ; United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 220 Tenn.
120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.
2d 583 (Tex. 1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152
S.E.2d 436 (1967).
23. See, e.g., Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 392 (7th
Cir. 1969); Employer Mut. Cas. Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 111 (10h Cir.
1967) ; Federal Ins. Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 153 N.W.2d 429 (1967) ; Graves
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 252 La. 709, 214 So.2d 116 (1968) ; State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 301 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Colo. 1969); Faltersack v.
Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis.2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 32Z-(1968).
24. See generally Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444
S.W.2d 583, 586-88 (Tex. 1969); Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at
841-47; Concurrent Coverage, supra note 14, at 321-22; Watson, The "Other Inurance"
Dilemma, 1966 INs. L.J. 151, 153-54; Comment, "Other Inmrance" Clauses: The LAmB-
WESTON Doctrinw, 47 ORE. L. REv. 430, 432-33 (1968).
25. See W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 144, at 842 (3d ed.
Anderson 1951) ; Note, "Other Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. Rav. 147, 148
(1952) ; Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 845.
26. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d 653
(6th Cir. 1940). See also W. VANCE, supra note 25, at 842-44; Kearns Coal Corp. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 118 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
579 (1941) ; Air Transp. Mfr. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal. App2d
129, 204 :.2d 647 (1949). Contra, Funke v. Minnesota Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n,
29 Minn. 347, 13 N.W. 164 (1882), where a "voiding" clause of the first policy was
given effect in a fire insurance case making the subsequent insurer liable.
27. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952) ; Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d
583, 587 (Tex. 1969) ; Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175
N.W.2d 413, 417 (1970) ; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co.,
209 F. Supp. 83, 89 (N.D. W.Va. 1962); Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note
13, at 846.
28. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 190 Minn. 528,
252 N.W. 434 (1934) ; American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Mut. Indem. Co., 161
F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1947); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 51 Ohio App.
323, 200 N.E. 849 (1935). See Concurrent Coverage, supra note 14, at 322; Automobile
Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 843-44.
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this rule is occasionally used,29 it has generally been rejected because
liability policies are purchased with the intent of covering persons not
specifically named,3" and because the primary tortfeasor frequently is
not named in either policy.3'
Finally, the "specific-general coverage" theory determined the
primary insurer on the basis of which policy provided more specific
coverage of the insured's loss.3 This method of liability allocation initially
arose in situations where one insured held two policies." Although some
language has been borrowed from this area, 4 the theory has been dis-
regarded as inapplicable to the instant problem. 3
29. In the case of Universial Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 5
Ariz. App. 174, 424 P.2d 465 (1967), "M" permitted "J", an employee of a garage, to
take her car to the garage for repair, however, while driving the car to the garage "i"
negligently caused injury to an innocent third party. The issue before the court was
which insurer should be held primarily liable: the insurer of the owner "M" (Dairyland)
or the insurer of the garage (Universal). The court found for the owner's insurer stating
that "[s- ince Dairyland's insured, was at most passively negligent, her (and Dairy-
land's) liability would be secondary." Id. at 178, 424 P.2d at 468. The court's adherence
to the "primary tortfeasor" theory is even more evident in the following statement found
in a subsequent opinion denying a motion for rehearing:
[W]e are dealing with a question of dual or concurrent coverage and although
we will admit that there is respectable authority to the contrary, we believe and
hold that as between insurance policies the policy covering the primary tort-
feasor will provide primary coverage.
5 Ariz. App. 296, 299, 425 P.2d 866, 869 (1967). This decision was overruled in Univer-
sal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966(1968) in which the court adopted the majority view of liability allocation discussed at
length in notes 37-80 infra.
30. See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs. L.J.
151, 153.
31. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d
583 (Tex. 1969) ; Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d
110 (1959); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1941).
32. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Cochran Mills & Ginnery
Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856 (1921) ; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. General
Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 138 Ohio St. 488, 35 N.E.2d 836 (1941)(alternative holding); Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal.2d 731,
117 P.2d 661 (1941); 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE. § 4914, at
400 (2d ed. 1962).
33. The leading case involving this method of conflict resolution is Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Cochran Mill & Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288,
105 S.E. 856 (1921), where the court held insurer "A" primarily liable to pay the
insured's liability to an injured employee because "A" 's coverage, under the circumstances
of the injury, was specifically limited to personal injuries of employees; whereas, "B",
the insured's other insurer, covered losses to property as well as personal injuries of
employees.
34. See Zurich Gen Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 720 (7th
Cir. 1942).
35. See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195
F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Consolidated Shippers, Inc. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co.,
45 Cal. App.2d 288, 114 P.2d 34, (1941) ; Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Pacific
"OTHER INSURANCE"
These three theories which courts have employed and then rejected
over the years emphasize the extreme difficulties inherent in resolving
the instant problem. Evidence of Judge Beamer's realization of the
unsatisfactory evolution of this area of the law and the problems it
presents are found in his statement that "[N]numerous courts in other
jurisdictions have wrestled with it, but the only result has been the
gradual emergence of two more or less dominant approaches."3 "
Majority View
The leading case for the majority87 view is Zurich General Accident
& Liability Insurance Co. v. Clamor.8 On facts nearly identical to those
Employers Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 188, 227 P. 2d 53 (1951) ; Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. 1969); Iowa Ins. Co. v.
Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1970); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Suttenfield, 236 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Note, Conflicting Interpretations of
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 28 IND. L.J. 429, 442 (1953); Automobile Liability Insur-
ance, supra note 13, at 842.
36. 312 F. Supp. at 1387.
37. Those states following the majority rule are: Alabama-Continental Nat'l Am.
Group v. Burleson, 283 Ala. 671, 220 So.2d 611 (1969); Arizona-Dairyland Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Andersen, 102 Ariz. 515, 433 P2d 963 (1967); Arkansas-Jones v. Morrison,
284 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Ark. 1968); California-Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969); Connecticut-American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. Weir, 132 Conn. 557, 46 A.2d 7 (1946); Florida-Continental Cas. Co. v.
Weekes, 74 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1954); Illinois-New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 34 Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966) ; Kansas-Mary-
land Cas. Co. v. American Family Ins. Group, 199 Kan. 373, 429 P.2d 931 (1967);
Kentucky-Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 415 S.W.2d 581
(Ky. 1967); Maryland-Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 244 Md. 392,
223 A.2d 594 (1966) ; Massachusetts-August A. Busch & Co. v. Libery Mut. Ins. Co.,
339 Mass. 239, 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959); Michigan-Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959); Minnesota-Federal Ins. Co. v.
Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 153 N.W.2d 429 (1967); Mississippi-International Service
Ins. Cb. v. Ballard, 216 So.2d 535 (Miss. 1968) (dictum); Missouri-Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 337 S.W2d 566 (Mo. App. 1960); Montana-Mountain
States Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 135 Mont. 475, 342 P.2d 748 (1959);
Nebraska-Turpin v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959) ;
New Jersey-American Sur. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 343, 72 A.2d
798 (1950) ; New Mexico-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation Reserve Ins.
Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737 (1967); New York-General Accident Fire & Life
Assur. Corp. v. Piazza, 4 N.Y.2d 659, 152 N.E.2d 236, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958); North
Carolha-Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E2d 436
(1967) ; North Dakota-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwest Leasing Corp.,
299 F. Supp. 630 (D. N.D. 1969); Ohio-State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Home
Indem. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio St.2d 45, 261 N.E.2d 128 (1970) ; Oklahoma-Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 389 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Pennsylvania-Gras-
berger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939) ; South Caroliha-Wrenn
& Outlaw, Inc. v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E.2d 741 (1965) ;
Utah-Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah2d 157, 417 P.2d 658 (1966) ; Washington-General
Ins. Co. of America v. State Farm Ins. Co., 75 Wash.2d 200, 449 P.2d 391 (1969);
Wisconsin-Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis.2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322 (1968).
38. 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941) [hereinafter cited as Zurichl.
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in the principle case, Zurich held the owner's insurer primarily liable by
giving effect to the excess clause of the driver's policy.39 The owner's
policy contained an escape clause in its "other insurance" provision. Judge
Major recognized the lack of compelling logic in his choice of which
clause should be given effect"° by stating that "[t]he old controversy as
to which came first, the hen or the egg, would be almost as easy of
solution as the instant problem."'"
The basic premise of the Zurich case is that conflicting "other
insurance" clauses are amenable to the usual rules of interpretation of
insurance contracts for determining the intention of the parties.2 The
often quoted passage of Zurich pronounces that "[a] decision must
rest upon a construction of the language employed by the respective
insurers.''" Implicit in this view is judicial recognition that "other
insurance" clauses represent attempts by insurers to set varying limits
of liability for different risk situations, 4 and that freedom to contract
would be circumscribed if "other insurance" provisions were ignored. 5
39. Id., at 720.
40. For example, if one begins with the policy containing the escape clause, this
insurer is no longer liable since the other policy provides other insurance to effectuate
the former's escape provision. However, if one begins with the excess clause policy this
insurer is only required to provide excess coverage because the policy with the escape
clause is valid insurance to bring into force the former's excess provision. An exerpt
from the case of Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75
Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969), expresses the circular riddle involved in attempting to reconcile
conflicting clauses by relying solely on the language of the provisions:
We next examine the texts of the two insurance policies for enlightenment as
to which insurer should be held primarily liable. In this process counsel for
each insurer points to language in the comprehensive liability policy of the
other insurer to establish coverage by the other insurer and then points to
exculpatory language in the policy of his own client which purports to propel
liability elsewhere in instances of dual coverage. From these exculpations each
counsel triumphantly concludes that the liability of the other insurer is primary
and that of his own client is excess .... this approach takes us nowhere
except in a large circle.
Id. at 797-98, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
41. 124 F.2d at 719.
42. McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 232 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mont. 1964);
Continental Gas. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 275 F2d 381 (7th Cir. 1960) ;
Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Air
Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal. App.2d 129, 204 P2d 647
(1949); Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 102 Ariz. 515, 433 P.2d 963 (1967);
Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 244 Md. 392, 223 A2d 594 (1966). See
generally Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 847 Note, Iimsrance-Con-
flicting "Other Insurance" Clauses, 20 ARic. L. R v. 370, 372 (1967) ; Comment, "Other
Insurance" Clauses: The LAImB-WEsTO, Doctrine, ORE. L. REv. 430, 433 (1968).
43. 124 F.2d at 720.
44. Watson, The "Other Isurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs. LJ. 151, 154.
45. See Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 244 Md. 392, 223 A.2d 594
(1966); D.M.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 96 Ariz. 399,
396 P.2d 20 (1964) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d
276
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Thus, once the court found substantive differences in the clauses they
felt bound to interpret the intent of the parties through a construction
of the respective clauses." However, if the two clauses were identical,
the court recognized in dicta, that reconciliation through interpretation
would be impossible."
Another aspect of the Zurich decision was the honoring of an excess
over an escape clause. 8 Several commentators attribute judicial pre-
ference of excess clauses over other types to the misapplication of the
rules afforded "true" excess provisions." The "true" excess clause is
436 (1967) where the court clearly supports the idea that it is the function of the judici-
ary to attempt to carry out specifications contained in the "other insurance" clause. The
court quoted directly from Muncie v. Travelers Insurance Co., 253 N.C. 74, 79-80, 116
S.E2d 474, 478 (1960) :
Freedom of contract, unless contrary to public policy or prohibited by
statute, is a fundamental right included in our constitutional guaranties ....
Since the contractual provision is, as related to the facts of this case, a valid
one, the parties are entitled to have it enforced as written. We cannot ignore any
part of the contract.
269 N.C. at 345, 152 S.E.2d at 440.
46. 124 F.2d at 720.
47. Id:
We think the logic of this reasoning [finding a difference between an
excess and an escape clause] is made apparent by assuming that neither of the
policies contained an "other insurance" provision or that both policies con-
tained an "other insurance" provision in exactly the same language. It could
not be seriously argued, in our opinion, but that under either of such situations
the two insurers would be liable in proportion to the amount of insurance
provided by their respective policies.
The writer was unable to find a case of concurrent coverage in which neither policy
contained an "other insurance" provision. However, it seems logical that where each
insurer would be primarily liable but for the other and neither has specifically accounted
for such a contingency, each should be held liable for a prorata share of the loss.
Courts have consistently arrived at results in accord with the above Zurich dictum
in cases involving conflicting identical "other insurance" clauses, i.e., prorating the loss
among the insurers on the basis of their respective limits of liability. The rationale for
proration in prorata vs. prorata situations is that ordering the loss to be apportioned is
merely in keeping with the expressed intent of both parties. In situatons involving
identical excess or escape clauses, the courts prorate because if effect were given to both
clauses this would leave the insured without coverage. Also, since the language is identical
there is no rational means available to distinguish between the clauses.
For examples see prorata vs. prorata-Celina Mut. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Cas. Co.,
194 Md. 236, 71 A.2d 20 (1950) ; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 611 (1952) ; excess vs. excess-
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Pacific Employer Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App.2d 188,
227 P.2d 53 (1951) ; Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554,
147 A.2d 529 (1959); Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 163 F. Supp. 325 (D. Fla. 1958); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960); escape vs.
escape-the writer was unable to find any American appellate decisions involving a
conflict between this type of clause. But see Weddell v. Road Transp. & Gen. Ins. Co.,
2 K.B. 563 (1931) and Gale v. Motor Union Ins. Co., [1928] 1 K.B. 359 (1926), where
the loss was prorated.
48. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Concurrent Coverage, supra note 14, at 326; Automobile Liability Insur-
ance, supra note 13, at 852-53.
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generally found in special policies issued to an insured which only
provide coverage above that afforded in other stated policies." It is
more likely, however, that the principle factor influencing the court's
favor of the excess clause is the general dislike for clauses which seek to
avoid all liability.51 The reasoning behind disfavor of escape clauses
appears to be based on the misuse of the insurance doctrine of resolving
questions concerning the existence of coverage against the insurer.
Courts have continued to favor excess over escape clauses as did
Zurich.52 Consequently, when an excess provision conflicts with either
a prorata 5 or an escape54 clause the insurer using the latter types is held
primarily liable. 5 Because the above situations frequently occur, courts
presume the intent of the parties on the basis of the types of clauses
involved."8 The results, as to whether the owner's or driver's insurer is
primarily liable, have also been generally consistent in finding that the
owner's insurer provides primary coverage.5"
Cases such as New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Certain Under-
writers at Lloyds, London,5" extend these rules of presumed intent one
step further into a rule of thumb that the insurer of the vehicle involved
50. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. v. Saskatchewan Gov't Ins. Office, 238 Ore. 8, 391
P.2d 616 (1964). See generally 16 G. COUCH, supra note 13, at § 62:68.
51. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 13, at § 4914 (Supp. 1970).
52. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
53. To effectuate this preference the courts hold that the policy containing the
excess clause is valid "other insurance," thus the insurer whose policy contains the pro-
rata clause is primarily liable. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.
v. Piazza, 4 N.Y.2d 659, 152 N.E.2d 236, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958) ; Turpin v. Standard
Reliance Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 233, 99 N.W.2d 26 (1959) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. American
Family Ins. Group, 199 Kan. 373, 429 P.2d 931 (1967); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737 (1967) ; Wrenn & Outlaw,
Inc. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E.2d 741 (1965); Con-
tinental Nat'l Am. Group v. Burleson, 283 Ala. 671, 220 So.2d 611 (1969); 16 G.
CoucH, supra note 13, at § 62:71; 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 13, at § 4914; Annot., 76
A.L.R. 502, 505 (1961).
54. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London,
34 Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966) ; Federal Ins. Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218,
153 N.W.2d 429 (1967) ; Automobile Liability Insurance, supra note 13, at 854; 16 G.
CoucH, supra note 13, at § 62:76; Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1163, 1165 (1956).
55. There are few cases in which an escape and a prorata clause have conflicted.
However, the usual result has been to hold the insurer whose policy contains the prorata
clause primarily liable. McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952) ;
Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash.2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d
1163, 1167 (1956).
56. See Continental Nat'l Am. Group v. Burleson, 283 Ala. 671, 220 So.2d 611
(1969) ; Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 244 Md. 392, 223 A.2d 594
(1966) ; Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 75 Wash.2d 200, 449 P.2d 391
(1969).
57. See, e.g., notes 53-54 supra where the court in each of the cited cases held the
owner's insurer primarily liable.
58. 34 Ill.2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966).
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is presumed to have intended to become primarily liable in a concurrent
coverage situation.5" The New Amsterdam opinion illustrates the im-
portance courts ascribe to the relationship of the insured to the vehicle in
concurrent coverage situations by restating the Zurich holding" in
terms of "driver" and "owner." 61 Arguably, the New Amsterdam case
represents a "codification" of prior cases into the generality that there
exists a presumption that the insurer of the owner will be primarily
liable, although a portion of the holding appears to be based on the types
of clauses involved. Insurance companies recognize the presumption and
seek to facilitate judicial ease in employing it by the draftsmanship found
in almost all general policies.62 If this were not the case, insurance com-
panies could use excess clauses in their coverage of permissive users and
avoid the result. At least one court has explicitly recognized the "owner-
pays" presumption while taking judicial notice of the custom and practice
of the insurance industry.6"
Since the majority view ultimately rests on the particular language
of the "other insurance" provision,64 its method of reconciliation is sub-
ject to change as the draftsmanship of the various provisions is altered.
The specific escape clause is an example of the use of draftsmanship to
alter the normal result that escape clauses are disfavored :65 [this policy
59. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1969), where the court explicitly recognizes the presumption in the following
language:
Respondent .. .relies on the general rule that, other things being equal,
primary liability falls on the insurer of the owner rather than on the insurer of
the operator. No statute compels such a result, and its origin apparently lies
in custom and practice within the inslirance business, which is followed by
the courts ....
Id. at 798-99, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
60. 124 F.2d at 720.
61. 34 Ill.2d 424, 428-29, 216 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1966).
62. See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, SAMPLE INSURANCE POLICIES:
PROPERTY LIABILITY COVERAGES 20 (1968) :
Other Imurance: If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by
Part I of this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a
greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the
declaration bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and
collectable insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance with
respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall
be excess insurance over any other valid and collectable insurance.
If such a clause appears in both the driver's and owner's policy, then the owner's policy
would provide prorata coverage and the driver's policy would extend excess coverage.
Since the courts have consistently held the insurer whose policy contains the prorata
clause primarily liable, the "other insurance" provision, supra, illustrates the insurers'
acceptance of the "owner-pays" rule.
63. See note 59 supra.
64. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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covers] " any other person, but only if no other valid and collectable
automobile liability insurance, either primary or excess . . . is available to
such person .. . 66 By the insertion of the phrase "either primary or
excess," insurers have succeeded in reversing the presumptions in favor
of excess clauses6" and that the owner's insurer is primarily liable.8
Consequently, when faced with a conflict between an excess and a
specific escape clause the courts have held the insurer whose policy con-
tains the excess provision primarily liable.69 The courts reason that
since insurers employing specific escape provisions have anticipated the
existence of an excess clause in the driver's liability policy and have
expressly contracted to avoid liability in concurrent coverage situations,
their express intentions should be enforced."0
At first glance these cases would appear to foster an endless battle of
draftsmanship between insurers, thus creating an incentive for additional
litigation.7' However, specific escape clauses have generally been used
only in garage liability"2 and automobile leasing"3 policies which re-
present unique business relationships. Although these decisions represent
exceptions to the usual results reached when the standard presumptions
are used, the reasoning is in keeping with general contract doctrine which
66. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 344. 152, S.E.2d 436,
439 (1967) (emphasis added). See also Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis2d 64,
65, 158 N.W.2d 322, 323 (1968). Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.2d 367 (Fla.
1954) in the following language provides an example of early specific escape clauses:
The insurance does not apply:
(4) to any liability for such loss as is covered on a primary, contributory,
excess, or any other basis by insurance in another insurance company.
Id. at 367.
67. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
69. Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1954); Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 415 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967) ; Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967); Faltersack v. Vanden
Boogaard, 39 Wis.2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322 (1968); Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1969) (applying Illinois law). Contra, State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio St. 2d 45, 261 N.E.2d 128 (1970).
70. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
71. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583
(Tex. 1969); Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N.W2d
413 (1970) :
The myriad problems attendant upon "other insurance" clauses is not
new, and the conflicting solutions adopted demonstrate a frustrating judicial
attempt to resolve what appears to be an endless interindustry semantic battle.
Id. at 414. Cf. United Services Auto, Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 220
Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967).
72. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d
436 (1967); Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis.2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322 (1968);
Indiana Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1969).
73. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So2d 367 (Fla. 1954).
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allows parties to contract for what they desire."4
The case of Pacific Indemnity v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.7"
represents a slightly different approach within the majority view's
framework. The issue in Pacific Indemnity was which of two insurers,
either the insurer of the lessee-operator or the insurer of the lessor-owner,
should bear the loss attributable to the operation of an automobile leased
for a two-year period. The court concluded that an examination of the
two policies, which both contained excess clauses, led it "nowhere
except in a large circle."7 After stating that there is no public policy
involved in litigation on concurrent coverage issues between insurers
since it is never contended that the injured third party is not protected,7"
the court set forth a method of resolving the dispute:
.. . in the construction of ambiguous policies the literal terms
of the policies themselves carry less weight than the substance
of the transaction involved .... If the evidence in a particular
case shows the parties intended some other arrangement, then
as with other contracts, the specific intention of the parties will
displace a general intention attributable to them in their
silence."8
The Pacific Indemnity theory carries the search for intent beyond
the literal language of the "other insurance" clauses into an examination
of the substance of the transaction.7" Specifically, the court in Pacific
Indemnity found the lessee's insurer primarily liable because of a pro-
vision in the leasing contract in which the lessee agreed to assume the
responsibility of insuring the vehicle."0 However, in situations where
there is a lack of external evidence, the Pacific Indemnity approach pre-
sumes that the owner's insurer intended to provide coverage where other
insurance is available.
74. 1 A. CoRBiN, COR IN ON CONTRACTs § 1 (1963).
75. 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Pacific
Indeinnity].
76. Id. at 797, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
77. Id. at 796, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
78. Id. at 798-99, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
79. Id. at 799, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 563:
But the rule placing primary liability on the insurer of the owner in instances
of duplicate coverage is a product of presumed intention and is only applied
when the parties have made no specific agreement on the subject. If the evidence
in a particular case shows the parties intended some other arrangement, then,
as with other contracts, the specific intention of the parties will displace a general
intention attributable to them in their silence. Their specific agreement will
override the general rule.
80. Id. at 800, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 564-65.
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Minority View
The leading case presenting the minority view8' is Oregon Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,82 in which
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with conflicting excess
and escape clauses on facts similar to those of the principal case. The
insurer whose policy contained the escape clause appealed a judgment
assigning primary liability to it. The basis of the decision was that the
policy containing the excess clause constituted "other insurance" to
effectuate the escape clause. The circuit court reversed, and in holding
that liability should be prorated among the insurers the court specifically
rejected the majority view as a means to reconcile concurrent liability.
By doing so, the court created a different" means of loss allocation
among concurrent insurers:
In our opinion the "other insurance" provisions of the
two policies are indistinguishable in meaning and intent. One
cannot rationally choose between them .... Here, where both
policies carry like "other insurance" provisions, we think they
must be held mutually repugnant and hence be disregarded.
Our conclusion is that such view affords the only rational
solution of the dispute in this case. The proration is to be
applied in respect both of damages and of the expense of
defending the suits.84
The minority view represents a rejection of the majority's principle
assumption that conflicting "other insurance" clauses are reconcilable
through interpretation." It views attempts to assign primary and second-
ary liability on the basis of the language of the provisions as a "circular
riddle":86 "[The] reasoning [of the majority] appears to us com-
81. Those states following the minority rule are: Colorado-State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 301 F. Supp. 1131 (D. Colo. 1969) ; Indiana-
Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc. 312 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ;
Iowa-Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N.W.2d 413(1970); Louisiana-Graves v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 252 La. 709, 214 So.2d 116
(1968); Oregon-Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d
110 (1959) ; Tennessee-United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
220 Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967) ; Te.ras-Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
82. 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
83. See note 47 supra in which it is pointed out that the majority view also
prorates losses, but only in cases where the clauses are identical.
84. 195 F.2d at 960.
85. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952) ; Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d
110 (1959).
86. Attempting to reconcile conflicting clauses through a construction of the
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pletely circular, depending as it were, on which policy one happens to
read first."87 Courts adopting the minority view question the effacacy
of searching for the intent of insurers through a construction of the
clauses when they are but "fortuitous adversaries"88 with no privity of
contract existing between them. Furthermore, advocates of the minority
position question the need of construction when it is self-evident that
the intentions of both the insurers are to reduce or eliminate liability in
this instance.8 " That these problems led Judge Beamer, in the principal
case, to adopt the minority view, is evidenced by the following language:
Cases of this type cannot be resolved either by a literal reading
of the language used or by an inquiry into intent.
And the only way to effectuate the intent of both companies
would be by holding neither liable-a result which would
obviously be contrary to public policy. Under the circumstances,
the only fair solution, and the one which this court believes
would be adopted by the Indiana courts, is to find the excess
clause and the escape clause mutually repugnant, and to require
the two insurers to share the loss in proportion to the limits
of their respective policies.9"
In several recent cases adopting the minority position, courts have
advanced a public policy argument which has been rejected in at least
one majority rule holding.9' This public policy argument is best stated in
United Services Automobile Association v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co. :92
language, Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N.W2d 413,
417 (1970) states it "is at best a pseudo-solution in that it only aggravates a circular
riddle." See also Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444
S.W.2d 583, 589 (Tex. 1969); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore.
110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959).
87. 195 F.2d at 960.
88. Taken from the title of the following article dealing with concurrent coverage
in loading and unloading situations: Brown and Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The
Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 197 (1962).
89. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1386,
1388 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
90. 312 F. Supp. at 1388.
91. Public policy arguments have been advanced in Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969); Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-, 175 N.W.2d 413 (1970) and United Services Auto.
Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 220 Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967). For a
discussion of Pacific Indemnity, which rejects the public policy argument, see notes 75-
80 supra and accompanying text.
92. 220 Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967).
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Under the authorities urged upon us [majority view cases
yielding conflicting results], it seems inescapable that the
rights of the assured become badly obscured, if not defeated,
by the contractual contest engaged in by casualty insurers."
However, this argument lacks persuasiveness because in the usual situa-
tion, litigation occurs either before the insured's liability is determined,
in the form of a declaratory judgment or after one insurer has assumed
primary liability, in an action for contribution.94
The minority courts also charge that the majority view "encourages
the continuing battle of draftsmanship of still more specific policy
terms."9 Since the five most recent cases96 adopting the minority view
involved specific escape clauses conflicting with excess clauses, one might
consider them as a direct response to this charge.97 If the minority view
becomes widely accepted, one commentator contends that it will lower
insurance premiums by reducing the amount of costly litigation insurers
undergo to determine primary liability.98
Conclusion
At first glance, the prorata rule adopted by Judge Beamer is
appealing because of its simplicity of application. However, the modified
application of the majority view found in Pacific Indemnity"9 provides
a more legally justifiable solution consonant with accepted contract
principles. Pacific I'ndemnity takes a forthright approach by presuming
an intent except where the parties can prove a specific intent. Such a rule
permits parties involved in unique risk situations to determine respon-
sibility for coverage as desired. This conclusion is based on the premise
93. Id. at 129, 414 S.W.2d at 840.
94. No case was found in which the insured was left without coverage while the
insurers litigated the issue of liability allocation.
95. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d
583, 588 (Tex. 1969). See Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-,
175 N.W2d 413, 417 (1970). See also Concurrent Coverage, supra note 14, at 322.
96. United Services Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 220 Tenn.
120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967) ; Graves v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 252 La. 709, 214 So.2d
116 (1968); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d
583 (Tex. 1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 301 F.
Supp. 1131 (D. Colo. 1969); Union Ins. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., -Iowa-,
175 N.W.2d 413 (1970).
97. It seems implicit in the courts' language criticizing the battle of draftmanship
that they view the minority rule as a means of alleviating some of the pressure on the
universally overloaded court dockets, thus indirectly advancing a public interest by
reducing the waiting period now facing any litigant.
98. See, Note, Conflicting Interpretation of "Other Insurance" Clauses, 28
IND. L.J. 429, 435 (1953).
99. 269 Cal. App.2d 793, 75 Cal. Rptr. 559. See notes 75-80 supra for the discussion
of the California court's method of loss allocation in a concurrent coverage situation.
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that there is no overriding public policy considerations which would
warrant closing out parties' ability to contract as they desire. Thus, it
could be argued that the minority view is the more arbitrary of the two
views because of its total disregard of "other insurance" clauses.
The ideal solution to the problem of concurrent liability insurance
coverage would be for insurers to formulate inter-company agreements
establishing rules for loss allocation in reoccurring problem areas. The
multitude of cases litigated on this issue illustrates that insurers have
placed the burden for creating a solution on the judicial system.
E. ALAN KiRTLEY
